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1 Introduction
Two-sided assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) have been generalized to the
multi-sided case. In this case, agents are distributed in m disjoint sectors. Usually it is
assumed that these agents are linked by a hypergraph defined by the (basic) coalitions
formed by exactly one agent from each sector (see for instance Kaneko and Wooders,
1982; Quint, 1991). A matching for a coalition S is a partition of the set of agents of S
in basic coalitions and, since each basic coalition has a value attached, the worth of an
arbitrary coalition of agents is obtained by maximizing, over all possible matchings, the
addition of values of basic coalitions in a matching.
If we do not require that each basic coalition has exactly one agent of each side but
allow for coalitions of smaller size, as long as they do not contain two agents from the
same sector, we obtain a larger class of games, see Atay et al. (2016) for the three-sided
case. But in both cases, the classical multi-sided assignment market and this enlarged
model, the core of the corresponding coalitional game may be empty, and this is the main
difference with the two-sided assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972), where the
core is always non-empty.
A two-sided assignment game can also be looked at in another way. There is an
underlying bi-partite (weighted) graph, where the set of nodes corresponds to the set of
agents and the weight of an edge is the value of the basic coalition formed by its adjacent
nodes. From this point of view, the generalization to a market with m > 2 sectors can
be defined by a weighted m-partite graph G. In an m-partite graph the set of nodes N
is partitioned in m sets N1, N2, . . . , Nm in such a way that two nodes in a same set of
the partition are never connected by an edge. Each node in G corresponds to an agent
of our market and each set Ni, for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, to a different sector. We do not
assume that the graph is complete but we do assume that the subgraph determined by
any two sectors Ni and Nj, with i 6= j, is either empty or complete. Because of that,
the graph G determines a quotient graph G, the nodes of which are the sectors and two
sectors are connected in G whenever their corresponding subgraph in G is non-empty.
For each pair of sectors Nr and Ns, r 6= s, that are connected in G, we have a
bilateral assignment market with valuation matrix A{r,s}. For each i ∈ Nr and j ∈ Ns,
entry a
{r,s}
ij is the weight in G of the edge {i, j}, and represents the value created by the
cooperation of i and j.
Given the m-partite graph G, a coalition of agents in N is basic if it does not contain
two agents from the same sector and its members are connected in G. Then, the worth
of a basic coalition is the addition of the weights of the edges in G that are determined by
nodes in the coalition. An optimal matching in this market is a partition of N in basic
coalitions such that the sum of values is maximum among all possible such partitions.
We show that if there exists an optimal matching for the multi-sided m-partite
market that induces an optimal matching in each bilateral market determined by the
connected sectors, then the core of the multi-sided market is non-empty. Moreover,
a core element can be obtained by the merging of one core element from each of the
underlying bilateral markets associated to the connected sectors.
Secondly, if the quotient graph G is cycle-free, then the above sufficient condition for
a non-empty core always holds and, moreover, the core of the multi-sided assignment
game is fully described by the “merging” or “composition” of the cores of the underlying
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bilateral games. As a consequence, we prove several properties of the core of this multi-
sided market. For instance, for each sector there exists a core allocation where all agents
in the sector achieve their marginal contribution.
This model of multi-sided assignment market on an m-partite graph G where the
quotient graph G is cycle-free can be related to the locally-additive multi-sided assign-
ment games of Stuart (1997), where the sectors are organized on a chain and the worth
of a basic coalition is also the addition of the worths of pairs of consecutive sectors.
However, in Stuart’s model all coalitions of size smaller than m have null worth. It can
also be related with a model in Quint (1991) in which a value is attached to each pair of
agents of different sectors and then the worth of an m-tuple is the addition of the values
of its pairs. Again, the difference with our model is that in Quint (1991) the worth of
smaller coalitions is zero. In particular, the worth of a two-player coalition is taken to
be zero instead of the value of this pair. Notice that in these models the cooperation of
one agent from each side is needed to generate some profit. Compared to that, in our
model, any set of connected agents from different sectors yields some worth that can be
shared.
For arbitrary coalitional games, cooperation restricted by communication graphs was
introduced by Myerson (1977) and some examples of more recent studies are van Velzen
et al. (2008), Khmelnitskaya and Talman (2014), and Gonza´lez-Arangu¨ena et al. (2015).
The difference with our work is that in the multi-sided assignment game on an m-partite
graph there exist well-structured subgames, the two-sided markets between connected
sectors, that provide valuable information about the multi-sided market.
Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3, for an arbitrary m-partite graph, we
provide a sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core. Section 4 focuses on the
case in which the quotient graph is cycle-free. In that case, we completely characterize
the non-empty core in terms of the cores of the two-sided markets between connected
sectors. From that fact, additional consequences on some particular core elements are
derived. In Section 5, once selected a spanning tree of the cycle-free graph G, we
characterize the core of the multi-sided assignment game in terms of competitive prices.
Finally, Section 6 concludes with some remarks.
2 The model
Let N be the finite set of agents in a market situation. The set N is partitioned in m
sets N1, N2, . . . , Nm, each sector maybe representing a set of agents with a specific role
in the market. There is a graph G with set of nodes {N1, N2, . . . , Nm}, that we simply
denote {1, 2, . . . ,m} when no confusion arises, and we will identify the graph with its
set of edges.1 The graph G induces another graph on the set of agents N such that
{i, j} ∈ G if and only if there exist r, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that r 6= s, i ∈ Nr, j ∈ Ns
and {r, s} ∈ G. Notice that the graph G is an m-partite graph, that meaning that two
agents on the same sector are not connected in G. We say that graph G is the quotient
1A graph consists of a (finite) set of nodes and a set of edges, where an edge is a subset formed by
two different nodes. If {r, s} is an edge of a given graph, we say that the nodes r and s belong to this
edge or are adjacent to this edge.
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graph of G.2
For any pair of connected sectors {r, s} ∈ G, there is a non-negative valuation
matrix A{r,s} and for all i ∈ Nr and j ∈ Ns, v({i, j}) = a{r,s}ij represents the value
obtained by the cooperation of agents i and j. Notice that these valuation matrices,
A = {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G, determine a system of weights on the graph G, and for each pair
of connected sectors {r, s} ∈ G, (Nr, Ns, A{r,s}) defines a bilateral assignment market.
Sometimes, to simplify notation, we will write Ars, with r < s, instead of A{r,s}.
Then, γ = (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;G; {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G) is a multi-sided assignment market on
an m-partite graph. When necessary, we will write GA to denote the weighted graph
with the nodes and edges of G and the weights defined by the matrices {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G.
Given any such market γ, a coalition S ⊆ N defines a submarket γ|S = (S ∩N1, . . . , S ∩
Nm;G|S;A|S) where G|S is the subgraph of G defined by the nodes in S and A|S consists
of the values of A that correspond to edges {i, j} in the subgraph G|S.
We now introduce a coalitional game related to the above market situation. To this
end, we first define the worth of some coalitions that we name basic coalitions and then
the worth of arbitrary coalitions will be obtained just imposing superadditivity. A basic
coalition E is a subset of agents belonging to sectors that are connected in the quotient
graph G and with no two agents of the same sector. That is, E = {i1, i2, . . . , ik} ⊆ N is
a basic coalition if (i1, i2, . . . , ik) ∈ Nl1 × Nl2 × · · · × Nlk and the sectors {l1, l2, . . . , lk}
are all different and connected in G. Sometimes we will identify the basic coalition
E = {i1, i2, . . . , ik} with the k-tuple (i1, i2, . . . , ik). For the sake of notation, we denote
by BN the set of basic coalitions of market γ, though we should write BN1,...,Nm , since
which coalitions are basic heavily depends on the partition in sectors of the set of agents.
Notice that all edges of G belong to BN . Moreover, if S ⊆ N , we denote by BS the set
of basic coalitions that have all their agents in S: BS = {E ∈ BN | E ⊆ S}.
The valuation function, until now defined on the edges of G, is extended to all basic
coalitions by additivity: the value of a basic coalition E ∈ BN is the addition of the
weights of all edges in G with adjacent nodes in E. For all E ∈ BN ,
v(E) =
∑
{i,j}∈G|E
v({i, j}) =
∑
i∈E∩Nr,j∈E∩Ns
{r,s}∈G
a
{r,s}
ij . (1)
A matching µ for the market γ is a partition of N = N1 ∪ N2 ∪ · · · ∪ Nm in basic
coalitions in BN . We denote by M(N1, N2, . . . , Nm) the set of all matchings. Similarly,
a matching for a submarket γ|S with S ⊆ N is a partition of S in basic coalitions in BS.
A matching µ ∈ M(N1, N2, . . . , Nm) is an optimal matching for the market
γ = (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;G; {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G) if it holds
∑
T∈µ v(T ) ≥
∑
T∈µ′ v(T ) for all other
matching µ′ ∈ M(N1, N2, . . . , Nm). We denote by Mγ(N1, N2, . . . , Nm) the set of opti-
mal matchings for market γ.
Then, the multi-sided assignment game associated with the market γ is the pair
(N,wγ), where the worth of an arbitrary coalition S ⊆ N is the addition of the values
2Equivalently, we could introduce the model by first imposing a (weighted) m-partite garph on
N = N1 ∪N2 ∪ . . .∪Nm with the condition that its restriction to Nr ∪Ns for all r, s ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
different, is either empty or a bi-partite complete graph. Then, the quotient graph G is easily defined.
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of the basic coalitions in an optimal matching for this coalition S:
wγ(S) = max
µ∈M(S∩N1,...,S∩Nm)
∑
T∈µ
v(T ), (2)
with wγ(∅) = 0. Notice that if S ⊆ N is a basic coalition, wγ(S) = v(S), since no
partition of S in smaller basic coalitions can yield a higher value, because of its definition
(1) and the non-negativity of weights. Trivially, the game (N,wγ) is superadditive as it
is a special type of partitioning game introduced by Kaneko and Wooders (1982).
Multi-sided assignment games on m-partite graphs combine the idea of cooperation
structures based on graphs (Myerson, 1977) and also the notion of (multi-sided) match-
ing that only allows for at most one agent of each sector in a basic coalition. It is clear
that for m = 2, multi-sided assignment games on bi-partite graphs coincide with the
classical Shapley and Shubik (1972) assignment games. Notice also that for m = 3,
multi-sided assignment games on 3-partite graphs are a particular case of the general-
ized three-sided assignment games in Atay et al. (2016), with the constraint that the
value of a three-person coalition is the addition of the values of all its pairs.
As for the related quotient graphs, for m = 2 the quotient graph G consists of only
one edge while, for m = 3, G can be either a complete graph3 or a chain. Figure 1
illustrates both the graph G and its quotient graph G for the cases m = 2 and m = 3.
G
G
N1 N2
N1
N2 N3
N1 N2 N3A
12 A12 A13
A23
A12 A23
Figure 1: 2-partite and 3-partite graphs, and their quotient representation
As in any coalitional game, the aim is to allocate the worth of the grand coalition
in such a way that preserves the cooperation among the agents. Given a multi-sided
assignment market on an m-partite graph γ = (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;G; {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G), a
vector x ∈ RN , where N = N1 ∪ N2 ∪ · · · ∪ Nm, is a payoff vector. An imputation is
a payoff vector x ∈ RN that is efficient, ∑i∈N xi = wγ(N), and individually rational,
xi ≥ wγ({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Then, the core C(wγ) is the set of imputations that no
coalition can object, that is
∑
i∈S xi ≥ wγ(S) for all S ⊆ N . Because of the definition of
3A graph is complete if any two of its nodes are connected by an edge. Hence, an m-partite graph
with more than one node in some of the sectors is never complete in this sense. A complete m-partite
graph is an m-partite graph such that any two nodes from different sectors are connected by an edge.
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the characteristic function wγ in (2), given any optimal matching µ ∈Mγ(N1, . . . , Nm),
the core is described by
C(wγ) =
{
x ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈E
xi = v(E) for all E ∈ µ,
∑
i∈E
xi ≥ v(E), for all E ∈ BN
}
.
A multi-sided assignment game on an m-partite graph is balanced if it has a non-
empty core. Moreover, and following Le Breton et al. (1992), we will say an m-partite
graph (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;G) is strongly balanced if for any set of non-negative weights
{A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G the resulting multi-sided assignment game is balanced. Recall from Shap-
ley and Shubik (1972) that bi-partite graphs are strongly balanced. Our aim is to study
whether this property extends to m-partite graphs or balancedness depends on proper-
ties of the weights or the structure of the graph.
3 Balancedness conditions
The first question above is easily answered. For m ≥ 3, m-partite graphs are not
strongly balanced. Take for instance a market with three agents on each sector. Sectors
are connected by a complete graph: N1 = {1, 2, 3}, N2 = {1′, 2′, 3′}, N3 = {1′′, 2′′, 3′′},
and G = {(N1, N2), (N1, N3), (N2, N3)}. From Le Breton et al. (1992) we know that a
graph is strongly balanced if any balanced collection4 formed by basic coalitions contains
a partition. In our example, the collection
C = {{1, 1′}, {1, 2′′}, {2′, 1′′}, {2, 3′}, {3, 2′′}, {3′, 1′′}, {3, 3′′}, {2, 1′}, {2′, 3′′}}
is balanced (notice each agent belongs to exactly two coalitions in C) but we cannot
extract any partition. To better understand what causes the core to be empty we
complete the above 3-partite graph with a system of weights and analyse some core
constraints.
Example 1. Let us consider the following valuations on the complete 3-partite graph
with three agents in each sector:
A12 =

1′ 2′ 3′
1 1 0 0
2 9 0 4
3 0 0 0
 A13 =

1′′ 2′′ 3′′
1 0 5 0
2 0 0 0
3 0 2 4
 A23 =

1′′ 2′′ 3′′
1′ 0 0 0
2′ 4 0 6
3′ 2 0 0
.
In boldface we show the optimal matching for each two-sided assignment market. Now,
applying (1), the reader can obtain the worth of all three-player basic coalitions and
check that the optimal matching of the three-sided market is
µ = {(2, 1′, 1′′), (1, 3′, 2′′), (3, 2′, 3′′)}.
4Given a coalitional game (N, v), a collection of coalitions C = {S1, S2, . . . , Sk} with Sl ⊆ N for all
l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, is balanced if there exist positive numbers δSl > 0 such that, for all i ∈ N , it holds∑
i∈Sl⊆C δSl = 1.
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Notice that v({2, 1′, 1′′}) = 9 + 0 + 0 = 9, v({1, 3′, 2′′}) = 0 + 5 + 0 = 5 and
v({3, 2′, 3′′}) = 0 + 4 + 6 = 10.
Take x = (u, v, w) ∈ RN1×RN2×RN3 . If x = (u, v, w) ∈ C(wγ), from core constraints
u2 + v1 +w1 = 9 and u2 + v1 ≥ 9 we obtain w1 = 0. Then, from v3 +w1 ≥ 2 we deduce
v3 ≥ 2. Hence, u1 + v3 + w2 = 5 implies u1 + w2 ≤ 3, which contradicts the core
constraint u1 + w2 ≥ 5. Therefore, C(wγ) = ∅.
We observe that the optimal matching µ in the above example induces a matching
µ23 = {(1′, 1′′), (3′, 2′′), (2′, 3′′)} for the market (N2, N3, A{2,3}) which is not optimal. Let
us relate more formally the matchings in a multi-sided assignment market on an m-
partite graph with the matchings of the two-sided markets associated with the edges of
the quotient graph.
Definition 2. Given γ = (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;G; {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G), for each matching µ ∈
M(N1, . . . , Nm) and each adjacent sectors {r, s} ∈ G, we define a matching µ{r,s} ∈
M(Nr, Ns) by
{i, j} ∈ µ{r,s} if and only if there exists E ∈ µ such that {i, j} ⊆ E. (3)
We then say that µ is the composition of µ{r,s} for {r, s} ∈ G and write
µ =
⊕
{r,s}∈G
µ{r,s}.
Conversely, the composition of matchings of each underlying two-sided market not
always results in a matching of the multi-sided assignment market. Take for instance
matchings µ{1,2} = {(2, 1′), (1, 3′), (3, 2′)}, µ{1,3} = {(1, 2′′), (2, 1′′), (3, 3′′)} and µ{2,3} =
{(1′, 2′′), (2′, 3′′), (3′, 1′′)} in Example 1. Since (1′, 2′′) ∈ µ{2,3}, (2, 1′) ∈ µ{1,2} and
(1, 2′′) ∈ µ{1,3}, both 1 and 2 should be in the same coalition when composing µ{1,2} ⊕
µ{1,3} ⊕ µ{2,3}, but then this coalition would not be basic since it contains two agents
from N1, and the composition would not be a matching of the three-sided market.
Next proposition states that whenever the composition of optimal matchings of the
underlying two-sided markets results in a matching of the multi-sided market on an m-
partite graph, then that matching is optimal and the core of the multi-sided assignment
market is non-empty. To show this second part we need to combine payoff vectors of
each underlying two-sided market (Nr, Ns, A
{r,s}), with {r, s} ∈ G, to produce a payoff
vector x ∈ RN for the multi-sided market γ. We write C(wA{r,s}) to denote the core of
these two-sided assignment games.
Definition 3. Given γ = (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;G; {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G), let x{r,s} ∈ RNr ×RNs for
all {r, s} ∈ G. Then,
x =
⊕
{r,s}∈G
x{r,s} ∈ RN is defined by
xi =
∑
{r,s}∈G
x
{r,s}
i , for all i ∈ Nr, r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
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We then say that the payoff vector x =
⊕
{r,s}∈G x
{r,s} ∈ RN is the composition of
the payoff vectors x{r,s} ∈ RNr × RNs . Similarly, we denote the set of payoff vectors
in RN that result from the composition of core elements of the underlying two-sided
assignment markets by
⊕
{r,s}∈GC(wA{r,s}).
Proposition 4. Let γ = (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;G; {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G) be a multi-sided assignment
market on an m-partite graph. If there exists µ ∈M(N1, . . . , Nm) such that µ{r,s} is an
optimal matching of (Nr, Ns, A
{r,s}) for all {r, s} ∈ G, then
1. µ is optimal for γ and
2. γ is balanced and moreover
⊕
{r,s}∈GC(wA{r,s}) ⊆ C(wγ).
Proof. To see that µ =
⊕
{r,s}∈G µ
{r,s} is optimal for γ, take any other matching µ˜ ∈
M(N1, . . . , Nm) and let µ˜{r,s} ∈ M(Nr, Ns), for {r, s} ∈ G, be the matching µ˜ induces
in each underlying two-sided market. That is, µ˜ =
⊕
{r,s}∈G µ˜
{r,s}. Now, applying (1),∑
E∈µ
v(E) =
∑
E∈µ
∑
i∈Nr∩E
j∈Ns∩E
{r,s}∈G
v({i, j}) =
∑
{r,s}∈G
∑
{i,j}∈µ{r,s}
v({i, j})
≥
∑
{r,s}∈G
∑
{i,j}∈µ˜{r,s}
v({i, j}) =
∑
E∈µ˜
v(E),
where the inequality follows from the assumption on the optimality of µ{r,s} in each
market (Nr, Ns, A
{r,s}), for {r, s} ∈ G. Hence, µ is optimal for the multi-sided market
γ.
Take now, for each {r, s} ∈ G, x{r,s} ∈ C(wA{r,s}). Define the payoff vector x ∈ RN
as in Definition 3, xi =
∑
{r,s}∈G x
{r,s}
i , for all i ∈ Nr, r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. We will see
that x ∈ C(wγ). Given any basic coalition E ∈ BN ,∑
i∈E
xi =
m∑
r=1
∑
i∈E∩Nr
xi =
m∑
r=1
∑
i∈E∩Nr
∑
{r,s}∈G
x
{r,s}
i
≥
m∑
r=1
∑
i∈E∩Nr
∑
{r,s}∈G
E∩Ns 6=∅
x
{r,s}
i =
∑
{r,s}∈G
E∩Nr 6=∅
E∩Ns 6=∅
∑
i∈E∩Nr
j∈E∩Ns
(
x
{r,s}
i + x
{r,s}
j
)
≥
∑
{r,s}∈G
i∈E∩Nr
j∈E∩Ns
v({i, j}) = v(E),
where both inequalities follow from x{r,s} ∈ C(wA{r,s}) for all {r, s} ∈ G. Notice also
that if E ∈ µ the above inequalities cannot be strict and hence ∑i∈E xi = v(E). Indeed,
if i ∈ E ∩ Nr, {r, s} ∈ G and E ∩ Ns = ∅, then i is unmatched by µ{r,s} and, because
of the optimality of µ{r,s}, x{r,s}i = 0. Similarly, if i ∈ E ∩ Nr and j ∈ E ∩ Ns, then
{i, j} ∈ µ{r,s} and hence x{r,s}i + x{r,s}j = v({i, j}).
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The above proposition gives a sufficient condition for optimality of a matching and
for balancedness of a multi-sided assignment game on an m-partite graph. However,
this condition is not necessary. The matching µ in Example 1 is optimal while µ{2,3} is
not. The core of the market in Example 1 is empty, but one can find similar examples
with non-empty core (see Example 15).
Finally, even under the assumption of the proposition, that is, when the composition
of optimal matchings of the two-sided markets leads to a matching of the multi-sided
market, the core may contain more elements than those produced by the composition of
the cores of (Nr, Ns, A
{r,s}), for {r, s} ∈ G (see Atay et al. (2016) for an example in the
three-sided case). The inclusion
⊕
{r,s}∈GC(wA{r,s}) ⊆ C(wγ) will become an equality
for some particular graphs.
4 When G is cycle-free: strong balancedness
In this section we assume that the quotient graph G of the m-partite graph G does not
contain cycles. We will assume without loss of generality that it is connected, since the
results in that case are easily extended to the case of a finite union of disjoint cycle-free
graphs.
We select a node of G as a source, that is, we select a spanning tree of G. Define the
distance d of any other node as the number of edges in the unique path that connects this
node to the source. Then, without loss of generality, we rename the nodes of G in such
a way that the source has label 1 and, given two other nodes r and s, if d(1, r) < d(1, s)
then r < s. Notice that the labels of nodes at the same distance to the source are
assigned arbitrarily.
A partial order is defined on the set of nodes of a tree in the following way: given
two nodes r and s, we say that s follows r, and write s  r, if given the unique path
in the tree that connects s to the source, {s1 = 1, s2, . . . , sq = s}, it holds r = sp for
some p ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1}. If r = sq−1 we say that s is an immediate follower of r. We
denote by SGr the set of followers of r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, we write SˆGr = {r} ∪ SGr when
we need to include sector r, and we denote by IGr the set of immediate followers of
r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Our main result states that an m-partite graph G where the quotient graph G is a
tree is strongly balanced.
Theorem 5. Let γ = (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;G; {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G) be a multi-sided assignment
market on an m-partite graph. If G is cycle-free, then (N,wγ) is balanced and
C(wγ) =
⊕
{r,s}∈G
C(wA{r,s}).
Proof. Notice first that when G is a tree, the composition of optimal matchings µ{r,s}
of each underlying two-sided market (Nr, Ns, A
{r,s}), for {r, s} ∈ G, leads to a matching
in M(N1, N2, . . . , Nm). To see that, we define a binary relation on the set of agents
N = N1 ∪ N2 ∪ · · · ∪ Nm. Two agents i ∈ Nr and j ∈ Ns, with r ≤ s, are related if
either i = j or there exist sectors {r = s1, s2, . . . , st = s} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and agents
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ik ∈ Nsk for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t} such that {sk, sk+1} ∈ G and {ik, ik+1} ∈ µ{sk,sk+1}, for
all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t − 1}. This is an equivalence relation and, because G is a tree, in
each equivalence class there are no two agents of the same sector. Hence, the set µ of
all equivalence classes is a matching and by its definition it is the composition of the
matchings µ{r,s} of the two-sided markets: µ =
⊕
{r,s}∈G µ
{r,s}. Now, by Proposition 4,
µ is an optimal matching for the multi-sided market γ and
⊕
{r,s}∈GC(wA{r,s}) ⊆ C(wγ),
which guarantees balancedness.
We will now prove that the converse inclusion also holds.
Let it be u = (u1, u2, . . . , um) ∈ C(wγ). We will define, for each {r, s} ∈ G, a payoff
vector (x{r,s}, y{r,s}) ∈ RNr × RNs . Take the optimal matching µ = ⊕{r,s}∈G µ{r,s} and
E ∈ µ. Let us denote by E = G|E the subtree in G determined by the sectors containing
agents in E and take as the source of E its sector s1 with the lowest label. Take any
leaf5 sr of E and let {s1, s2 . . . , sq, sq+1, . . . , sr−1, sr} be the unique path in E connecting
sr to the source s1. Let sq be the sector in this path with the highest label among those
that have more than one immediate follower in E (let us assume for simplicity that sq
has two immediate followers, sq+1 and sq′+1). Figure 2 depicts such a subtree E.
sq
sq−1
sq+1
sq+3
sq+2
sr−1
srsq′+1
sq′+2
sq′+3
sr′−1
sr′
s1
Figure 2: A subtree E for E ∈ µ
For each sector st with t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} we denote by it the unique agent in E that
belongs to this sector. Then, we define
y
{sr−1,sr}
ir
= usrir , (4)
x
{sr−1,sr}
ir−1 = a
{sr−1,sr}
ir−1ir − y{sr−1sr}ir , and (5)
y
{sr−2,sr−1}
ir−1 = u
sr−1
ir−1 − x{sr−1,sr}ir−1 . (6)
Iteratively, for all t ∈ {q + 1, . . . , r − 2}, we define
x
{st,st+1}
it
= a
{st,st+1}
itit+1
− y{st,st+1}it+1 , and (7)
y
{st−1,st}
it
= ustit − x{st,st+1}it , (8)
while for sector sq we define x
{sq ,sq+1}
iq
= a
{sq ,sq+1}
iqiq+1
− y{sq ,sq+1}iq+1 , and, assuming x
{sq ,sq′+1}
iq
has been defined analogously from the branch {sq′+1, sq′+2, . . . , sr′−1, sr′}, we also define
5Given a tree, a leaf is a node with no followers.
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y
{sq−1,sq}
iq
= u
sq
iq
−
(
x
{sq ,sq+1}
iq
+ x
{sq ,sq′+1}
iq
)
. More generally, if sq has several immediate
followers in E, then
y
{sq−1,sq}
iq
= u
sq
iq
−
∑
{sq,sl}∈E
sq<sl
x
{sq ,sl}
iq
. (9)
We proceed backwards until we reach x
{s1,sl}
i1
for all {s1, sl} ∈ E with s1 < sl.
In addition, if i ∈ Nr and for some {r, s} ∈ G, r < s, i is unmatched by µ{r,s}, define
x
{r,s}
i = 0. Similarly, if i ∈ Nr and for all {s, r} ∈ G, s < r, i is unmatched by µ{s,r},
define y
{s,r}
i = 0.
We will first check that the payoff vectors (x{r,s}, y{r,s}) we have defined are non-
negative for all {r, s} ∈ G. From (4) to (9) above, it follows that, for all maximal path
in E starting at s1, {s1, s2, . . . , sr}, and all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r− 1}, we can express x{st,st+1}it
in terms of the payoffs in u to agents in following sectors in E:
x
{st,st+1}
it
= a
{st,st+1}
itit+1
− y{st,st+1}it+1 = a{st,st+1}itit+1 − (ust+1it+1 −
∑
{st+1,l}∈E
l>st+1
x
{st+1,l}
it+1
)
= · · · = a{st,st+1}itit+1 +
∑
i∈Nr∩E
j∈Ns∩E
{r,s}∈E,r,s∈SˆEst+1
a
{r,s}
ij −
∑
k∈Nr∩E
r∈SˆEst+1
urk.
(10)
Hence, if T = {it} ∪ {i ∈ E | i ∈ Nr, r ∈ SˆEst+1}, we have
x
{st,st+1}
it
= v(T )− u(T \ {it}). (11)
Notice that for t = 1, because of efficiency of u ∈ C(wγ), we obtain∑
{s1,l}∈E
x
{s1,l}
i1
= v(E)−
∑
k∈E∩Nr
k 6=i1
urk = u
s1
i1
. (12)
Equation (10), together with (9) gives, for all t ∈ {2, . . . , r},
y
{st−1,st}
it
= ustit −
∑
{st,sl}∈E
st<sl
x
{st,sl}
it
= ustit −
∑
{st,sl}∈E
st<sl
a{st,sl}itil +
∑
i∈Nr∩E
j∈Ns∩E
{r,s}∈E,r,s∈SˆEsl
a
{r,s}
ij −
∑
k∈Nr∩E
r∈SˆEsl
urk
 ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows from the core constraint satisfied by u ∈ C(wγ) for coalition
T = {it} ∪ {i ∈ E | i ∈ Nr, r ∈ SEst}, that is, y{st−1,st}it = u(T )− v(T ) ≥ 0.
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Now, again making use of (4) to (12), we express x
{st,st+1}
it
in terms of the payoffs in
u to agents in sectors that do not follow st in E:
x
{st,st+1}
it
= ustit − y{st−1,st}it −
∑
{st,l}∈E
l>st,l 6=st+1
x
{st,l}
it
= ustit − a{st−1,st}it−1it + x{st−1,st}it−1 −
∑
{st,l}∈E
l>st,l 6=st+1
x
{st,l}
it
= · · ·
= ustit − a{st−1,st}it−1it + x{st−1,st}it−1 −
∑
{st,l}∈E
st<l6=st+1
(v(Tl)− u(Tl \ {it})),
where Tl = {it} ∪ {i ∈ E | i ∈ Nr, r ∈ SˆEl }. Recursively applying the same argument
(in first place to x
{st−1,st}
it−1 ), we eventually obtain
x
{st,st+1}
it
= u((T ′ \ T ) ∪ {it})− v((T ′ \ T ) ∪ {it}) ≥ 0,
with T ′ = {i1}∪ {i ∈ E | i ∈ Nr, r ∈ SEs1}, T as defined above, and where the inequality
also follows from u ∈ C(wγ).
Once proved that for all {r, s} ∈ G, (x{r,s}, y{r,s}) is a non-negative payoff vector, let
us check it is in C(wA{r,s}). If (i, j) ∈ µ{r,s} for some {r, s} ∈ G, then i and j belong
to the same basic coalition E of µ and x
{r,s}
i + y
{r,s}
j = a
{r,s}
ij follows by definition from
equations (5) and (7).
It only remains to prove that if i ∈ Nr, j ∈ Ns, with {r, s} ∈ G, r < s, and
(i, j) 6∈ µ{r,s}, then x{r,s}i +y{r,s}j ≥ a{r,s}ij . Since i and j are not matched in (Nr, Ns, A{r,s}),
they belong to different basic coalitions in µ. Let E and E ′ be the basic coalitions
containing i and j respectively. Let us consider a maximal path {s1, s2, . . . , st, . . . , sp}
in E with origin in the node in E with the lowest label (that we will name the source
of the subtree E) and such that there exists t ∈ {1, . . . , q} with r = st. We write
i1 ∈ E ∩ Ns1 . Similarly, let {s′1, s′2, . . . , s′l, . . . , s′p} be the maximal path in E ′ with
origin in the node in E ′ with the lowest label (the source) and such that there exists
l ∈ {1, . . . , p} with s = s′l.
Recall that, y
{r,s}
j = u(R)− v(R), where R = {j} ∪ {b ∈ E ′ | b ∈ Nk, k ∈ SE′s′l }, and
x
{r,s}
i = u((T
′ \ T ) ∪ {i})− v((T ′ \ T ) ∪ {i}), where T = {i} ∪ {b ∈ E | b ∈ Nk, k ∈ SEst}
and T ′ = {i1} ∪ {b ∈ E | b ∈ Nk, k ∈ SEs1}. Since E ∩ E ′ = ∅, (T ′ \ T ) ∪ {i} and R are
also disjoint. Then,
x
{r,s}
i + y
{r,s}
j = u((T
′ \ T ) ∪ {i}) + u(R)− v((T ′ \ T ) ∪ {i})− v(R) ≥ a{r,s}ij
since v((T ′ \ T ) ∪ {i} ∪ R) = v((T ′ \ T ) ∪ {i}) + v(R) + a{r,s}ij and u ∈ C(wγ). This
completes the proof of C(wγ) =
⊕
{r,s}∈GC(wA{r,s}).
The fact that the core of the multi-sided assignment game on an m-partite graph is
completely described by the cores of all underlying two-sided markets allows us to deduce
some properties of C(wγ) from the known properties of C(wA{r,s}), with {r, s} ∈ G.
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One of these consequences is that, for each sector r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, there is a core
element u ∈ C(wγ) where all agents in sector r simultaneously receive their maximum
core payoff, which is their marginal contribution to the grand coalition. This is one
property of two-sided assignment markets that does not extend to arbitrary multi-sided
markets but it is preserved when sectors are connected by a tree and the value of basic
coalitions is defined additively as in (1).
Proposition 6. Let γ = (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;G; {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G) be a multi-sided assignment
market on an m-partite graph. If G is a tree, then for each sector k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} there
exists u ∈ C(wγ) such that ui = wγ(N)− wγ(N \ {i}) for all i ∈ Nk.
Proof. Take any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. For all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with {k, s} ∈ G, take
(x{k,s}, y{k,s}) = (x{k,s}, y{k,s}) the element of C(wA{k,s}) that is optimal for all agents
in Nk. Similarly, for all r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that {r, k} ∈ G, take the element
(x{r,k}, y{r,k}) = (x{r,k}, y{r,k}) of C(wA{r,k}) that is optimal for the agents in Nk. These
optimal core elements exist in any bilateral assignment market (see Shapley and Shubik,
1972). Moreover, by Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983), it is known that for all i ∈ Nk,
x
{k,s}
i = wA{k,s}(Nk∪Ns)−wA{k,s}(Nk∪Ns\{i}) and y{r,k}i = wA{r,k}(Nr∪Nk)−wA{r,k}(Nr∪
Nk\{i}). Finally, for all {r, s} ∈ G with r 6= k and s 6= k, take an arbitrary core element
(x{r,s}, y{r,s}) ∈ C(wA{r,s}).
Now, if we consider the composition of the core elements defined above, we get, given
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, uk = ⊕{r,s}∈G(x{r,s}, y{r,s}).
Then, for all i ∈ Nk, if {r, k} ∈ G with r < k,
uki = y
{r,k}
i +
∑
{k,s}∈G
k<s
x
{k,s}
i ≥ ui
for all other u ∈ C(wγ), as a consequence of Theorem 5.
Moreover, if k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} is such that there exists r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with {r, k} ∈
G and r < k, and there exists s ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with {k, s} ∈ G and k < s, then
wγ(N)− wγ(N \ {i}) = [wA{r,k}(Nr ∪Nk)− wA{r,k}(Nr ∪Nk \ {i})]
+
∑
{k,s}∈G
k<s
[wA{k,s}(Nk ∪Ns)− wA{k,s}(Nk ∪Ns \ {i})]
= uki ,
for all i ∈ Nk.
Similarly, if k is a leaf of G, then
wγ(N)− wγ(N \ {i}) = wA{r,k}(Nr ∪Nk)− wA{r,k}(Nr ∪Nk \ {i}) = uki
for the only r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that {r, k} ∈ G and for all i ∈ Nk. Also, if k is the
source of the tree G, then
wγ(N)− wγ(N \ {i}) =
∑
{k,s}∈G
k<s
[wA{k,s}(Nk ∪Ns)− wA{k,s}(Nk ∪Ns \ {i})] = uki ,
for all i ∈ Nk.
Then, for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} we have uki = wγ(N)− wγ(N \ i) for all i ∈ Nk.
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Once proved in Theorem 5 that for an assignment market on an m-partite graph
with a cycle-free quotient graph G the core can be completely described from the cores
of the two-sided markets between connected sectors, the question arises whether some
other single-valued cooperative solutions of the market can be obtained in the same way.
As a first consequence we obtain that all extreme core allocations of the multi-sided
assignment game are obtained as the composition of extreme core allocations of the
underlying two-sided markets.
Proposition 7. Let γ = (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;G; {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G) be a multi-sided assignment
market on an m-partite graph. If G is cycle-free, then any extreme core allocation
x ∈ Ext(C(wγ)) is the composition of extreme core allocations of the underlying two-
sided markets, x =
⊕
{r,s}∈G x
{r,s}, where x{r,s} ∈ Ext(C(wA{r,s})) for all {r, s} ∈ G.
Proof. From Theorem 5, it is straightforward to see that x ∈ Ext(C(wγ)) satisfies
x =
⊕
{r,s}∈G x
{r,s} with x{r,s} ∈ C(wA{r,s}). Assume now that x{r′,s′} 6∈ Ext(C(wA{r′,s′}))
for some {r′, s′} ∈ G. Then, there exist two different elements, y{r′,s′} and z{r′,s′}, in
C(wA{r′,s′}) such that x
{r′,s′} = 1
2
y{r
′,s′} + 1
2
z{r
′,s′}.
We now consider two different elements in C(wγ) by composing
⊕
{r,s}∈G
{r,s}6={r′,s′}
x{r,s} either
with y{r
′,s′} or z{r
′,s′},
xy =
 ⊕
{r,s}∈G
{r,s}6={r′,s′}
x{r,s}
⊕ y{r′,s′} and xz =
 ⊕
{r,s}∈G
{r,s}6={r′,s′}
x{r,s}
⊕ z{r′,s′}.
It is then straightforward to check that x = 1
2
xy + 1
2
xz, which contradicts the as-
sumption x ∈ Ext(C(wγ)).
However, the converse implication does not hold, that is, the composition of extreme
core allocations of the underlying two-sided markets provides an element in C(wγ) which
may not be an extreme point (see Example 14 in the Appendix).
We now consider single-valued core selections that are not extreme points but usu-
ally interior core points. As a consequence of Theorem 5, the composition η⊕(wγ) =
⊕{r,s}∈Gη(wA{r,s}) of the nucleolus6 of the two-sided markets between connected sec-
tors belongs to C(wγ). Moreover, well-known algorithms to compute the nucleolus of a
two-sided assignment game (Solymosi and Raghavan, 1994; Mart´ınez de Albe´niz et al.,
2014) can be used to obtain η⊕(wγ). However, this composition does not coincide with
the nucleolus of the initial m-sided market γ = (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;G; {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G), as
Example 13 in the Appendix shows.
If we select the τ -value or fair-division point7 as the cooperative solution concept
to distribute the profits in each bilateral market, we can propose the composition
6The nucleolus of a coalitional game (N, v) is the payoff vector η(v) ∈ RN that lexicographically min-
imizes the vector of decreasingly ordered excesses of coalitions among all possible imputations (Schmei-
dler, 1969). An imputation for the game (N, v) is a payoff vector x ∈ RN that satisfies ∑i∈N xi = v(N)
and xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . The excess of coalition S ⊆ N at x ∈ RN is v(S)−
∑
i∈S xi.
7The fair-division point of a two-sided assignment market is the midpoint of the buyers-optimal
and the sellers-optimal core allocations Thompson (1981), and it coincides with the τ -value of the
corresponding assignment game (Nu´n˜ez and Rafels, 2002).
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of the τ -values of all connected two-sided markets, τ⊕(wγ) = ⊕{r,s}∈Gτ(wA{r,s}) as
an allocation of the profit of the multi-sided assignment market with a tree quotient
graph. Because of Theorem 5, this composition belongs to C(wγ) and can be con-
sidered as a fair division solution for the m-sided market. However, different to the
two-sided case, it may not coincide with the τ -value of the initial m-sided market
γ = (N1, N2, . . . , Nm;G; {A{r,s}}{r,s}∈G). In fact, the τ -value of a multi-sided assign-
ment market on an m-partite graph may lie outside the core (see Example 12 in the
Appendix), even when the quotient graph G is cycle-free.
5 Core and competitive prices in a market network
The aim of this section is to extend to multi-sided assignment games on an m-partite
graph the equivalence between core and competitive equilibria that Shapley and Shubik
(1972) prove for two-sided markets. To introduce prices and payments, we need to assign
some roles of buyers and/or sellers to the agents in the network.
Consider now m sectors N1, N2, . . . , Nm connected by a tree G and assume that the
source is at N1. Let us denote by L(G) the set of leaves of this tree, and by NL the
agents in these leaves. Each agent i in a sector r 6= 1 offers an object on sale and has
a reservation value ci ≥ 0 for this object, meaning that he/she will not sell below that
value. We denote by c the vector of sellers’ reservation values. At the same time, each
agent i ∈ Nr, with r 6∈ L(G), is willing to buy one object from each sector s > r such
that {s, r} ∈ G. Assume this agent i ∈ Nr places a value of wij ≥ 0 on the object of
agent j ∈ Ns with s > r and {r, s} ∈ G, and we denote wi the vectors of buyer i’s
valuations and by w the vector of all buyers’ valuations. Notice that each agent can sell
at most one object and buy several objects but at most one from the same sector.
This situation may represent a market network in which each agent at an intermedi-
ate sector acts independently both as a buyer in the downstream (higher labels) direction
and as a seller in the upstream direction, and pulls together the payoffs obtained in both
transactions. We assume all these transactions are independent, that is, an agent can
sell an item even if he/she is unmatched in the markets where he/she acts as a buyer.
That is, the basic coalitions are, as before, those coalitions connected by G and with
no two agents belonging to the same sector. Recall we do not require all sectors to be
present in each basic coalition.
These valuations (w, c) give rise to a multi-sided assignment market
γ = (N1, N2, ..., Nm;G; {Ar,s}{r,s}∈G) on an m-partite graph G with a tree quotient graph
G, where for all r, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, with {r, s} ∈ G, a{r,s}ij = max{0, wij − cj} for all i ∈
Nr and j ∈ Ns. We will then simply denote the market by γ = (N1, N2, ..., Nm;G;w, c).
Then, the value of a basic coalition E is
vw,c(E) =
∑
i∈E∩Nr,j∈E∩Ns
r<s,{r,s}∈G
max{0, wij − cj},
and from this valuation function the coalitional game (N,wγ) is defined as in (2).
Let us denote by Bk those basic coalitions containing buyer k ∈ Nr, for some r ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,m}, and only sellers in sectors that immediatly follow r. We refer to these
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coalitions as k-basic coalitions. That is,
Bk = {E ∈ BN | k ∈ E ∩Nr and (E \ {k}) ∩Nt = ∅, for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} \ IGr }.
Recall that IGr is the set of the immediate followers of r
IGr = {s ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} | s > r, {r, s} ∈ G}.
We want to show that each core allocation is obtained as the result of trading at
competitive prices. Therefore, we need to introduce some previous definitions in order
to define the notion of competitive price vector.
Given a multi-sided assignment market γ = (N1, N2, ..., Nm;G;w, c) where G is a
tree with source at N1, a feasible price vector is p ∈ RN2∪N3∪...∪Nm+ such that pj ≥ cj for
all j ∈
m⋃
l=2
Nl. Next, for each feasible price vector p ∈ RN2∪N3∪...∪Nm+ we introduce the
demand set of each buyer k ∈ Nr, with r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} \ L(G).
Definition 8. Let γ = (N1, N2, ..., Nm;G;w, c) be a multi-sided assignment market
where G is a tree with source at N1. The demand set of a buyer k ∈ Nr, r ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,m} \ L(G), at a feasible price vector p ∈ RN2∪N3∪...∪Nm+ is
Dk(p) = {E ∈ Bk |wk(E \ {k})− p(E \ {k}) (13)
≥ wk(E ′ \ {k})− p(E ′ \ {k}), ∀E ′ ∈ Bk},
where for all coalition T of sellers, wk(T ) =
∑
j∈T w
k
j and p(T ) =
∑
j∈T pj.
Note that Dk(p) describes the set of k-basic coalitions that maximize the net val-
uation of buyer k at prices p. Notice also that the demand set of a buyer k ∈ Nr,
for some r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} \ L(G), is always non-empty since k can always demand
E = {k} with a net profit of 0. If µ ∈ M(N1, N2, ..., Nm), for all k ∈ N \ NL we
write µ(k) to denote the k-basic coalition E such that k ∈ E ⊆ E ′ ∈ µ, that is,
µ(k) = {E ∈ Bk | there exists E ′ ∈ µ such that E ⊆ E ′}. Notice that µ(k) may consist
of only agent k, that meaning that k is not matched to any of his/her immediately
follower sellers.
Given a matching µ ∈ M(N1, N2, ..., Nm), we say a seller j ∈
m⋃
l=2
Nl is unassigned
(by µ) if there is no k ∈ Nr for some r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} \ L(G) such that j ∈ µ(k).
Now, we can introduce the notion of competitive equilibrium for the market γ on an
m-partite graph where G is a tree.
Definition 9. Let γ = (N1, N2, ..., Nm;G;w, c) be a multi-sided assignment market
on an m-partite graph, where G is a tree with source at N1. A pair (p, µ), where
p ∈ RN2∪N3∪...∪Nm+ is a feasible price vector and µ ∈ M(N1, N2, ..., Nm), is a competitive
equilibrium if
(i) for all buyer k ∈ Nr, r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} \ L(G), it holds µ(k) ∈ Dk(p),
(ii) for all seller j ∈
m⋃
l=2
Nl, if j is unassigned by µ, then pj = cj.
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If a pair (p, µ) is a competitive equilibrium, then we say that the price vector
p is a competitive equilibrium price vector. The corresponding payoff vector for a
given pair (p, µ) is called competitive equilibrium payoff vector. This payoff vector is
(u1(p, µ), u2(p, µ), ..., um(p, µ)) ∈ RN1 × RN2 × ...× RNm , defined by
u1k(p, µ) = w
k(µ(k) \ {k})− p(µ(k) \ {k}) for all k ∈ N1,
urk(p, µ) = w
k(µ(k) \ {k})− p(µ(k) \ {k}) + pk − ck
for all k ∈ Nr, r ∈ {2, . . . ,m} \ L(G),
urk(p, µ) = pk − ck for all k ∈ Nr, r ∈ L(G),
where for all coalition T of sellers, wk(T ) =
∑
j∈T w
k
j and p(T ) =
∑
j∈T pj. We denote
the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors of market γ by CE(γ).
We now study the relationship between the core of a multi-sided assignment market
on an m-partite graph γ = (N1, N2, ..., Nm;G;w, c) where G is a tree, and the set of
competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. First, we show that if a matching µ constitutes
a competitive equilibrium with a feasible price vector p, then µ is an optimal matching.
Lemma 10. Let γ = (N1, N2, ..., Nm;G;w, c) be a multi-sided assignment market on an
m-partite graph. If G is a tree and the pair (p, µ) is a competitive equilibrium, then µ
is an optimal matching.
Proof. Let us assume that G has a source at N1, and hence competitive equilibria are
defined as in Definition 9. In order to prove the statement, we need to show that if (p, µ)
is a competitive equilibrium, then the matching µ is a partition of maximal value. We
can assume without loss of generality that for all E ∈ µ, if i ∈ E ∩Nr, j ∈ E ∩Ns with
r < s and {r, s} ∈ G, then it holds wij−cj ≥ 0 and hence vw,c(E) =
∑
i∈E∩Nr,j∈E∩Ns
r<s,{r,s}∈G
wij−cj,
since otherwise E could be partitioned in basic coalitions satisfying the above condition
to obtain another matching that gives rise to the same value. Consider now another
matching µ′ ∈M(N1, N2, ..., Nm). Then,∑
E∈µ
vw,c(E) =
∑
k∈N\NL
wk(µ(k) \ {k})− c(µ(k) \ {k})
≥
∑
k∈N\NL
wk(µ′(k) \ {k})− c(µ(k) \ {k})− p(µ′(k) \ {k}) + p(µ(k) \ {k})
=
∑
k∈N\NL
wk(µ′(k) \ {k})− c(µ(k) \ {k})
− p
 ⋃
k∈N\NL
µ′(k) \N1

+ p
 ⋃
k∈N\NL
µ(k) \N1

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=
∑
k∈N\NL
wk(µ′(k) \ {k})− c
 ⋃
k∈N\NL
µ(k) \N1

− p
 ⋃
k∈N\NL
µ′(k) \
⋃
k∈N\NL
µ(k)
 \N1

+ p
 ⋃
k∈N\NL
µ(k) \
⋃
k∈N\NL
µ′(k)
 \N1

=
∑
k∈N\NL
wk(µ′(k) \ {k})− c
 ⋃
k∈N\NL
µ(k) \N1

− c
 ⋃
k∈N\NL
µ′(k) \
⋃
k∈N\NL
µ(k)
 \N1

+ p
 ⋃
k∈N\NL
µ(k) \
⋃
k∈N\NL
µ′(k)
 \N1

=
∑
k∈N\NL
wk(µ′(k) \ {k})− c
 ⋃
k∈N\NL
µ′(k) \N1

− c
 ⋃
k∈N\NL
µ(k) \
⋃
k∈N\NL
µ′(k)
 \N1

+ p
 ⋃
k∈N\NL
µ(k) \
⋃
k∈N\NL
µ′(k)
 \N1

≥
∑
k∈\NL
wk(µ′(k) \ {k})− c(µ′(k) \ {k}) =
∑
E∈µ′
vw,c(E),
where the first inequality follows from the definition of the demand set and the fact that
(p, µ) is a competitive equilibrium:
wk(µ(k) \ {k}) ≥ wk(µ′(k) \ {k})− p(µ′(k) \ {k}) + p(µ(k) \ {k}).
The fourth equality follows from the fact that for all
j ∈
 ⋃
k∈N\NL
µ′(k) \
⋃
k∈N\NL
µ(k)
 \N1, pj = cj,
and the last inequality follows from the feasibility of the price vector p.
Now, we can give the main result in this section.
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Theorem 11. Let γ = (N1, N2, ..., Nm;G;w, c) be a multi-sided assignment market on
an m-partite graph, where G is a tree. The core of the market, C(wγ), coincides with
the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors, CE(γ).
Proof. Assume that G has a source at N1, and hence competitive equilibria are de-
fined as in Definition 9. First, we show the implication that states if (p, µ) is a
competitive equilibrium, then its corresponding competitive equilibrium payoff vector
x = (u1(p, µ), u2(p, µ), ..., um(p, µ)) ∈ CE(γ) is a core element. As in the proof of Lemma
10, we can assume without loss of generality that vw,c(E) =
∑
i∈E∩Nr,j∈E∩Ns
r<s,{r,s}∈G
(wij − cj).
Recall that by definition urk(p, µ) = w
k(µ(k) \ {k})− p(µ(k) \ {k}) + pk − ck for all
k ∈ Nr for r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} \ L(G). Let us check that for all basic coalitions E ∈ BN
it holds x(E) ≥ vw,c(E). Notice that if E only contains one agent, then vw,c(E) = 0
and hence the core inequality holds. Otherwise, take E ∈ BN such that k ∈ E for some
k ∈ Nr with r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}\L(G). For each k ∈ E∩Nr with r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}\L(G),
denote by Ek the union of {k} with the set of j ∈ E∩Ns for some r < s with {r, s} ∈ G.
Notice that Ek is formed by agent k and those of his immediate followers that belong
to E. Then,
x(E) = p(E \N1)− c(E \N1) +
m∑
r=1
∑
k∈E∩Nr
r 6∈L(G)
wk(µ(k) \ {k})− p(µ(k) \ {k})
≥ p(E \N1)− c(E \N1) +
m∑
r=1
∑
k∈E∩Nr
r 6∈L(G)
wk(Ek \ {k})− p(Ek \ {k})
=
∑
k∈E∩Nr,j∈E∩Ns
r<s,{r,s}∈G
wkj − cj = vw,c(E),
where the inequality follows from the fact that (p, µ) is a competitive equilibrium. It
remains to check that x is efficient. Since µ is a partition of N = N1 ∪N2 ∪ ...∪Nm, we
get
x(N) =
m∑
r=1
∑
k∈Nr
r 6∈L(G)
[
wk(µ(k) \ {k})− p(µ(k) \ {k})]+ p(N \N1)− c(N \N1)
=
m∑
r=1
∑
k∈Nr
r 6∈L(G)
[
wk(µ(k) \ {k})− p(µ(k) \ {k}) + p(µ(k) \ {k})− c(µ(k) \ {k})]
+
m∑
s=2
∑
q∈Ns,q 6∈µ(k)
∀k∈N\NL
(pq − cq)
=
m∑
r=1
∑
k∈Nr
r/∈L(G)
[
wk(µ(k) \ {k})− c(µ(k) \ {k})]
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=
m∑
r=1
∑
k∈Nr
r/∈L(G)
vw,c(µ(k) \ {k}) =
∑
E∈µ
vw,c(E),
where the third equality holds since pq = cq for unassigned sellers q.
We have shown that if (p, µ) is a competitive equilibrium, then its competitive equi-
librium payoff vector x is a core allocation.
Next, we show that the reverse implication holds. That is, if x ∈ RN is a core
allocation, then it is the payoff vector related to a competitive equilibrium (p, µ), where
µ is any optimal matching and p is a competitive equilibrium price vector. Recall from
Theorem 5 that x =
⊕
{r,s}∈G x
{r,s}, where x{r,s} ∈ C(wA{r,s}).
For all s ∈ {2, . . . ,m} and all j ∈ Ns, define pj = x{r,s}j + cj, where r is the unique
sector in {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that {r, s} ∈ G. Notice first that since x ∈ C(wA{r,s}), if an
object j ∈ Ns is not assigned by the matching µ to any k ∈ Nr, then pj = xj + cj = cj.
Moreover, x{r,s}(µ(k)) = vw,c(µ(k)) for all k ∈ N \ NL and x{r,s}(E ′) ≥ vw,c(E ′) for all
E ′ ∈ Bk where k ∈ N \NL.
Then, for all k ∈ N \NL and all E ′ ∈ Bk,
wk(µ(k) \ {k})− p(µ(k) \ {k}) = vw,c(µ(k)) + c(µ(k) \ {k})− p(µ(k) \ {k})
= x{r,s}(µ(k)) + c(µ(k) \ {k})− p(µ(k) \ {k})
= x
{r,s}
k
≥ vw,c(E ′)− x{r,s}(E ′ \ {k})
= vw,c(E ′)− [p(E ′ \ {k})− c(E ′ \ {k})]
= wk(E ′ \ {k})− p(E ′ \ {k})
where the inequality follows from the fact that x ∈ C(wA{r,s}). This shows that µ(k) ∈
Dk(p) which concludes the proof.
Once shown that the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors of a multi-sided
assignment market on a cycle-free quotient graph G, CE(γ), coincides with the core of
the market, C(wγ), we have that a competitive equilibrium always exists for this model,
since we already know that the core is non-empty.
6 Concluding remarks
We have considered multi-sided markets where agents are on an m-partite graph that
induces a cycle-free network among the sectors. Basic coalitions do not need to have
agents from all sectors, it is enough not to have two agents from the same sector.
Moreover, the worth of a basic coalition is the addition of the worths of all its pairs that
are an edge of the m-partite graph.
A similar situation is considered in Stuart (1997), although restricted to the case
in which the network that connects the sectors is a chain. There, the worth of a basic
coalition is also defined additively, but, as in the classical multi-sided assignment games
in Kaneko and Wooders (1982) and Quint (1991), the set of basic coalitions is smaller
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since it is required that a basic coalition contains exactly one agent of each side. Al-
though the core of Stuart’s multi-sided game is also non-empty, it does not contain the
composition of all core elements of the underlying two sided markets.
Indeed, take N1 = {1, 2, 3}, N2 = {1′, 2′, 3′} and N3 = {1′′, 2′′}, and consider the
chain G = {{N1, N2}, {N2, N3}}. Assume also that a{r,s}ij = 1 for all (i, j) ∈ Nr × Ns
such that {Nr, Ns} ∈ G, but, unlike the model we present in this chapter, only triplets
may have a positive value. It is easy to see that (0.5, 0.5, 0.5; 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) ∈ C(wA{1,2})
and (0, 0, 0; 1, 1) ∈ C(wA{2,3}). However,
z = x⊕ y = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5; 0.5, 0.5, 0.5; 1, 1) /∈ C(wγ),
since an optimal matching consists of two triplets and hence the unassigned agents in
sectors N1 and N2 can only receive zero payoff in the core. Hence, our generalized
multi-sided markets, together with the cycle-free network structure, where the set of
basic coalitions has been enlarged, better inherits some properties of the core of the
well-known two-sided markets.
A final remark on the computation of an optimal matching for multi-sided assignment
markets is appropriate. Although the solution of the two-sided assignment problem is
solvable in polynomial time, the solution of its multi-sided extension is NP-hard (see
Garey and Johson, 1979). However, for a multi-sided assignment market on an m-
partite graph where the quotient graph that connects the sectors is cycle-free, an optimal
matching is computed in polynomial time. Indeed, from our Theorem 5 it follows that
the composition of optimal matchings of each underlying two-sided market yields an
optimal matching of the multi-sided assignment market. Since in a market with m
sectors any tree connecting the sectors has m − 1 edges, we have m − 1 underlying
two-sided markets and we only need to solve m− 1 linear programs to build an optimal
matching for the multi-sided market.
A Appendix
We consign to this appendix two examples that show that for a multi-sided assignment
game on a cycle-free quotient graph, the composition of the τ -values (or the nucleolus) of
each underlying two-sided market may not coincide with the τ -value or the nucleolus of
the initial multi-sided market. Similarly, the third example shows that by composition
of arbitrary extreme core allocations of each two-sided market we may not obtain an
extreme core allocation of the muti-sided market.
Example 12. Let us consider an assignment market γ on a 3-partite graph such that the
quotient graph is G = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}} which is cycle-free. The sectors are N1 = {1, 2},
N2 = {1′, 2′}, and N3 = {1′′, 2′′}. The valuation matrices of the two underlying two-sided
markets are
1′ 2′
1
2
(
2 0
5 4
) 1′′ 2′′
1′
2′
(
3 4
0 3
)
,
22
and the value of triplets is given by the following three-dimensional matrix
1′ 2′
1
2
(
5 0
8 4
)
1′′
1′ 2′
1
2
(
6 3
9 7
)
2′′
.
The τ -value of this multi-sided market game is τ(γ) = (5
9
, 24
9
; 29
9
, 15
9
; 15
9
, 20
9
) which is
not in the core. Hence, τ(γ) cannot coincide with τ(wA{1,2})⊕ τ(wA{2,3}).
Example 13. Let us consider an assignment market γ on the following 4-partite graph
related to the the quotient graph G = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}} which is cycle free. The
sectors are N1 = {1, 2}, N2 = {1′, 2′}, N3 = {1′′, 2′′}, N4 = {1′′′, 2′′′}, and the valuation
matrices of the two-sided markets are
A{1,2} =
(
2 3
0.5 2
)
, A{2,3} =
(
3 0.8
4 2
)
and A{2,4} =
(
2 0.6
2.4 2
)
.
The nucleolus of the three underlying two-sided markets are
η{1,2} = (1.625, 0.375; 0.375, 1.625), η{2,3} = (0.45, 1.55; 2.55, 0.45)
and η{2,4} = (0.55, 1.45; 1.45, 0.55)
and their composition is
η⊕ = (1.625, 0.375; 1.375, 4.625; 2.55, 0.45; 1.45, 0.55),
while the nucleolus of the six-player game (N,wγ) can be computed and is
η = (1.65, 0.4; 1.6, 4.75; 2.55, 0.45; 1.2, 0.4).
Example 14. Let us consider an assignment market γ on a 4-partite graph related
to the quotient graph G = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}} which is cycle-free. The sectors are
N1 = {1, 2}, N2 = {1′, 2′}, N3 = {1′′, 2′′}, and N4 = {1′′′, 2′′′}. The valuation matrices
of the three underlying two-sided markets are
A{1,2} =
( 1′ 2′
1 2 0
2 1 2
)
A{2,3} =
( 1′′ 2′′
1′ 2 1
2′ 0 2
)
A{2,4} =
( 1′′′ 2′′′
1′ 1 0
2′ 0 1
)
.
Take respective extreme core allocations of the three underlying two-sided markets
A{1,2}, A{2,3}, and A{2,4}: (2, 1; 0, 1), (2, 0; 0, 2), and (1, 0; 0, 1). Then, by composition we
get a core allocation for the multi-sided assignment market, x⊕ = (2, 1; 3, 1; 0, 2; 0, 1) ∈
C(wγ). But, there exist two core elements
y = (1.8, 0.8; 3.2, 1.2; 0, 2; 0, 1) ∈ C(wγ)
and
z = (2.2, 1.2; 2.8, 0.8; 0, 2; 0, 1) ∈ C(wγ)
such that x⊕ = 1
2
y + 1
2
z. Hence, x⊕ /∈ Ext(C(wγ)).
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This last example shows that assumptions of Proposition 4 are not necessary for the
non-emptiness of the core. In this example, the core of the multi-sided assignment game
is non-empty but the matching induced on one two-sided market is not optimal.
Example 15. Consider an assignment market γ on the complete 3-partite graph related
to the quotient graph G = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}}. The sectors are N1 = {1, 2}, N2 =
{1′, 2′}, N3 = {1′′, 2′′}, and the valuation matrices of the three underlying two-sided
markets are
A{1,2} =
( 1′ 2′
1 2 0
2 0 1
)
A{1,3} =
( 1′′ 2′′
1 0 1
2 1 0
)
A{2,3} =
( 1′′ 2′′
1′ 1 0
2′ 0 2
)
,
and the value of triplets is given by the following three-dimensional matrix
1′ 2′
1
2
(
3 0
2 2
)
1′′
1′ 2′
1
2
(
3 3
0 3
)
2′′
.
Note that there is only one optimal matching for the market γ. That is, µ =
{(1, 1′, 1′′), (2, 2′, 2′′)}. Notice also that x = (1, 1; 1, 1; 1, 1, 1) satisfies core constraints.
Hence, the core of the market γ, C(γ), is non-empty. Now, if we decompose the optimal
matching µ for the market γ, we observe that for the underlying two-sided market
(N1, N3, A
{1,3}) it induces a matching µ13 = {(1, 1′′), (2, 2′′)} which is not optimal.
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